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On the Internet and Sovereignty
SASKIA SASSEN °
INTRODUCTION
The focus of this brief essay is on the two basic constructs in Dean Henry
H. Perritt's article-the Internet and sovereignty.' My argument is that the
matters of democracy, jurisdiction, and international law discussed by Perritt
might look different if we based them on a more precise understanding of the
architecture of the Internet and the emergence of new non-state centered
governance mechanisms which have transformed the meaning of national
territorial sovereignty independently from whatever impact the Internet has had
so far. We cannot take either of these two categories as givens.
I should promptly add that I find Perritt has made an important contribution
to the lively and mostly fruitful debate about the impact of the Internet on
sovereignty that has been taking place over the last few years. However, as
someone currently researching both issues of sovereignty and the Internet, I am
concerned about the broader theoretical and political implications of their faulty
or partial characterization and theorization. The implications for technicalities
aboutjurisdiction and international law are less clearto me, and I will leave that
for experts on these subjects. My concern here is simply with the basic
elements on which Perritt builds his arguments. I sympathize politically with
the thrust of these arguments; especially the possibility that the Internet does not
simply erode sovereignty, that its effects will partly depend on the nature of the
states involved, whether they are liberal or totalitarian,2 and that the Internet
may strengthen democratic practice, therewith furthering broad liberal agendas.'
My problem is, first, with some of the features in Perritt's understanding of
what the Internet is, particularly the confusion of private and public digital
space and his reading of the impact of the growth of commercial and monetized
* Professor of Urban Planning, Columbia University. As of July I, 1998, Professor of Sociology,
University of Chicago.
1. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The Internet as a Threat to Sovereignty? Thoughts on the Internet's Role in
Strengthening National and Global Governance 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 423 (1998).
2. Id. at431.
3. Id. at 436-41.
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uses of the Internet.4 I am similarly concerned with Perritt's conception of
sovereignty; while Perritt's conception factors in the historicity and variability
of sovereignty and acknowledges different logics for its representation, his
analysis remains framed by the Liberal and Realist poles. In my reading, this
formulation brings with it a somewhat unproblematicized acceptance of
sovereignty as a given, at a time when we are seeing possibly significant
transformations not captured by either school of thought. I have elsewhere
described this transformation as a relocation of some components of national
state sovereignty to supranational and subnational entities, as well as to actors
operating outside national, private or public, legal frameworks. His adherence
to the Liberal theory of sovereignty creates its own set of problems in that it
lacks a critical perspective on whose claims gain legitimacy in the current
period characterized by the ascendance of markets and economic globalization.'
Making problematic the two basic categories-the Internet and
sovereignty-introduces a number ofqualifiers in some of the dualities running
through the debate, notably the Realist/Liberal opposition in theories of the
sovereign state and the interpretation of the Internet as representing either a
fundamental revolution or technological continuity in technologies of
communication.
I. THE INTERNET'S THIRD PHASE: NOVEL IMPLICATIONS FOR DEMOCRACY
There is little doubt that the Internet is an enormously important tool and
space for democratic participation at all levels, for strengthening civil society,
and for the formation of a whole new world oftransnational political and civic
projects. Many ofthe cases discussed by Perritt illustrate this well, notably the
difference the Internet made in some of the struggles associated with the
Bosnian-Serb conflict.' However, it has also become clear over the last few
years that the Internet is no longer what it was in the 1970s or 1980s; it has
become a contested space with considerable potential for segmentation and
4. See Saskia Sassen, Electronic Space andPower, in GLOBALIZAT7OAND ITsDIscoNTENTs: SELEcr
ESSAYS (forthcoming 1998).
5. See SASKIA SASSEN, LosiNG CONTROL? SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION (1996).
6. Perritt, supra note 1, at 432.
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privatization.' We cannot take its democratic potential as a given simply
because of its interconnectivity. We cannot take its "seamlessness" as a given
simply because of its technical properties. Lastly, we cannot take its bandwidth
availability as a given simply because of the putative exponential growth in
network capacity with each added network.'
This is a particular moment in the history of digital networks, one when
powerful corporate actors and high performance networks are strengthening the
role of private digital space and altering the structure of public digital space,
that is, the Internet. Digital space has emerged not simply as a means for
communicating, but as a major new theater for capital accumulation and the
operations of global capital.9
There is insufficient recognition that there is tension between some of the
features of the Internet that promote openness and interconnectivity, on the one
hand and, on the other, the rapid growth of software that seeks to facilitate and
expand private appropriation and use of the Internet. The first phase of the
Internet was confined largely to a community of insiders-scientists and select
government agencies. That community invented communication standards and
communication protocols that ensured access for all the members of that
community. The second phase of the Internet, centered in the 1980s, opened it
up to a far larger and less specialized community. This strengthened the
democratic and open character of the Internet and made it a space of distributed
power that limits the possibilities of authoritarian and monopoly control. It is
now well known that the particular features of the Internet are in part a function
of the early computer hacker culture that designed software that strengthened
the original design of the Internet-openness and decentralization-and sought
to make the software universally available for free. However, with the
establishment of the World Wide Web in 1993 and its large scale discovery by
7. See Sassen, Electronic Space and Power, supra note 4.
8. Usually referred to as Moore's Law. Gordon Moore, Intel co-founder, predicted in 1965 that processor
power would double every 18 months. Joshua Cooper Ramo, Chips Ahoy: Two Dazzling TechnicalAdvances
Promise to Fuel the Computer Revolution-At Least for a Few More Years, TiME, Oct. 6, 1997, at 72, 72.
Robert Metcalfe, whose dissertation led directly to his invention of the Ethernet in 1973, posited the power of
a network-how much it can do--to the square of the number of connected machines: P(n)=n2. That is, each
newly connected PC boosts the power of the network not geometrically but exponentially. Joshua Cooper
Ramo, Welcome to the Wired World, TIME, Feb. 3, 1997, at 30.
9. Much of the writing about electronic space and network power, however, has been shaped by the
properties of the Internet, especially its first two phases.
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business by 1995, the Internet has entered a third phase, one characterized by
attempts to commercialize it.'
The main point, in terms of Perritt's argument, is that this
commercialization, which he regards as an extension of the positive aspects of
the Internet," may in fact have negative consequences forthe civic and political
potential of the Internet and, in that regard, negative impacts on the Liberal state
agenda. This commercialization is pursued through the development of
software that can simultaneously capitalize on the Internet's features and
implement billing and payment systems, and it is pursued through the extension
of copyrights-the opposite of the early hacker culture. In my research, I have
come to regard the Internet as a space produced and marked through the
software that gives it its features. There are significant implications attached
to the fact that the leading Internet software design focus in the last two years
has been the design of"firewalls" and, in the last few months, the development
of so-called virtual business networks that operate over the Internet via
"tunneling" and encryption.'2 Both of these represent private appropriations of
a public space. 3 The rapid growth of this type of software in the Internet does
not necessarily strengthen the publicness of the Internet. This is especially
significant if there is less production of software aimed at strengthening the
publicness of the Internet. 4
10. Commercialization can enter the Internet in several ways. One is the emergence of firms that sell
access services to speed up access. This is not an essential service to gain access, but it is a convenience, and
an option for those with the income to pay for it. Another is the possibility of adding value (including
commercial value) to Internet features through the incorporation ofvoice and image, which consume enormous
bandwidth and hence may eventually be more easily subjected to premium pricing mechanisms than is e-mail.
When we consider the enormous amount of software design effort that is now going into producing programs
that can ensure safe credit card processing and other types of electronic payment, then we can see that
commercialization is likely to increase even though today it is minor. This could stimulate the creation of
World Wide Web sites that incorporate the latest developments ofvoice and image and could charge for access.
I think of the growing use of voice and image for non-essential uses as a de-greening of the Internet. E-mail is
a system of astounding efficiency and "ecological-soundness." Voice and image with their enormous
consumption of bandwidth are much less so.
!1. Perritt, supra note 1, at 439-40.
12. This saves companies the cost of private computer networks and frame relay connections. I return to
this later.
13. 1 am not referring here to the privatization of infrastructure that has also taken place over the last two
years. MCI has become a major owner of backbone structures that support the TCP/IP based network we call
the Internet.
14. For example, the failure of Digital City Berlin and of Digital City Vienna. The original Digital City,
Amsterdam, remains a lively and dynamic public space. It has taken enormous work and time on the part of
a group of dedicated founders and members to ensure its survival.
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In my reading, excessive commercialization, far from strengthening the
Internet's democratic potential, as Perritt maintains, can threaten it. Much of
the commercial potential and economic activities Perritt locates in the Internet"5
are actually part of private digital networks or firewalled (i.e., privatized) sites
in the Internet, a subject I return to later. However, even the far more limited
world of commerce can bring some problematic consequences to the democratic
potential of the Internet.
The Internet as a space of distributed power can thrive even against
growing commercialization. Non-commercial uses still dominate the Internet
today, but the race is on to invent ways to expand electronic commerce and to
ensure the safety of payment transactions. It is not easy. At the 1997 Aspen
Roundtable on Electronic Commerce, an annual event that brings together the
CEOs of the main software and hardware firms as well as the key venture
capitalists in the sector, insiders established that there are considerable limits
to the medium and that it will probably always cater to a particular set of niche
markets, with a few possible exceptions.'6
However, Internet activists may have to reinvent its representation as a
universal space. It may continue to be a space for de facto (i.e., not necessarily
self-conscious) democratic practices. However, it will be so partly as a form
of resistance against overarching powers of the economy and of hierarchical
power, rather than the space of unlimited freedom which is part of its
representation today. The images we must bring into this representation
increasingly need to deal with contestation and resistance, rather than simply the
romance of freedom and interconnectivity or the new frontier.
One important aspect of Perritt's argument about the positive democratic
effect of the Internet is that there has been a proliferation of non-commercial
uses and users. Civil society, whether it be individuals or non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), is a very energetic presence in cyberspace. From
struggles around human rights, the environment, and workers' strikes around
the world to genuinely trivial pursuits, the Internet has emerged as a powerful
medium for non-elites to communicate, support each other's struggles, and
create the equivalent of insider groups on scales ranging from the local to the
global.
15. See, e.g., Perritt, supra note 1, at 438-39.
16. See THE SiXTH ANNUAL AsPEN INSTrrfTfE ROUNDTABLE ON INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, THE
GLOBALIZATION OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (Aspen, Colorado, August 21-23, 1997) (forthcoming 1998).
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The political and civic potential of these trends is enormous. The Internet
offers the possibility for interested citizens to act in concert. Several authors
have examined the possibility of enhancing democratic practices through the
formation of communities on the Internet and the possible role of governments
in supporting them. 7 The possibility of doing so transnationally at a time when
a growing set of issues is seen as escaping the bounds of nation states makes
this even more significant. We are also seeing a greater variety of subcultures
on the Internet, which has until recently been dominated by young, white men,
especially from the United States. The growth of global corporate actors has
also profoundly altered the role of government in the digital era and, as a
consequence, has further raised the importance of civil society in electronic
space as a force through which a multiplicity of public interests can, wittingly
or not, resist the overwhelming influence of the new global corporate world.
II. DISTINGUISHING PRIVATE AND PUBLIC DIGITAL SPACE
It has become important to distinguish the Internet and private digital space.
Many of Perritt's assertions about economic processes, dynamics, and potentials
are happening in private digital space and have little to do with the Internet. 8
I consider this a serious, though fairly common, confusion. 9 Most financial
activity and other significant digital economic activities take place in private
digital networks. Further, much of the use firms make of the Internet today
assumes the form of firewalled web sites and, increasingly, privatized
"tunnels"-the new citadels on the Internet. This is not likely to strengthen
democratic practice.
17. See, e.g., HOWARD RHEINGOLD, THE VIRTUAL COMMUNITY: HOMESTEADING ON THE ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER (1993).
18. See Perritt, supra note 1, at 439 (discussing global markets); See also id. at 440 (discussing military
uses).
19. When it comes to the broader subject of network power, most computer networks are private. It might
be worth repeating that even if we consider only Internet Protocol (IP) compatible networks, and we examine
the figures for the period preceding the explosion of business interest in the Internet, it becomes evident that
during this period most networks were private: just counting networks (as opposed to traffic volume), in 1994
there were about 40,000 IP compatible networks, but the Internet itself accounted for about 12,000 of these.
That leaves a lot of network power that may not necessarily have the attributes of the Internet. Indeed, much
of this is concentrated power and reproduces hierarchy rather than distributed power. The financial markets,
operating largely through private electronic networks, are a good example of an alternative form of electronic
network power. The three properties of electronic networks, speed, simultaneity, and interconnectivity, have
produced strikingly different outcomes in this case from those of the Internet.
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Private digital networks are also making possible forms of power other than
the distributed power made possible by public digital networks. 0 The financial
markets illustrate this well. The three properties of electronic networks--speed,
simultaneity, and interconnectivity-have produced orders of magnitude far
surpassing anything we had ever seen in financial markets. The consequence
has been that the global capital market now has the powerto discipline national
governments, as became evident during the Mexico "crisis" of December 1994
and the current Asian crisis, when investors were capable of leaving en masse,
and the foreign currency markets had the orders of magnitude to alter exchange
rates radically for some of these currencies." It may also be significant that
although in some ways the power of these financial electronic networks rests on
a kind of distributed power-millions of investors and their millions of
decisions-it ends up as concentrated power. The trajectory followed by what
begins as a form of distributed power may assume many forms, in this case, one
radically different from that of the Internet.
It signals the possibility that network power is not inherently distributive.
Intervening mechanisms can re-shape its organization. To keep it as a form of
distributed power requires that it be embedded in a particular kind of structure.
In the case of the Internet, besides its feature as a network of networks and its
openness-two crucial elements-it may well be the absence of excessive
commercialization that has allowed it to thrive the way it has.
III. EMERGENT CYBER-SEGMENTATIONS
There are at least three distinct forms of what one could think of as
cyber-segmentation 2 One of these is the commercializing of access, a familiar
subject. A second is the emergence of intermediaries to sort, chose, and
evaluate information for paying customers. A third, and the one I want to focus
20. In this regard, it seems tome that we need to re-theorize electronic space and uncouple it analytically
from an exclusive focus on the properties of the Internet which have so sharply shaped our understanding. See,
e.g., Saskia Sassen, Electronic Space and Power, in GLOBALIZATION AND ITs DIscONmNTs, supra note 4.
21. The other half of this argument has to do with questions of normativity-the fact that the global
financial markets are not only capable of deploying raw power but also have produced a logic that now is seen
as setting the criteria for "proper" economic policy. The International Monetary Fund conditionality has some
of these features. There is an emerging literature on this. See, e.g. SAsSEN, LosiNG CONTROL, supra note 5, at
34-48.
22. Thus I use the term cyber-segmentation to describe a condition that is different from the fact that the
thousands of networks that constitute the Internet have distinct policies, designs, and protocols. One ofthe great
contributions of the early community that designed the communication standards and debugged the systems over
the last several decades was to make possible passage among these networks through a set of protocols.
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on briefly here, is the formation ofprivatized firewalled corporate networks on
the World Wide Web.
The existence ofcyber-segmentations means that beyond unequal conditions
for access to the Internet, once in cyberspace users will also encounter an
unequal geography of access-in this case to certain features, certain sites, and
certain high-speed connections. Those who can pay for it will have fast speed
servicing, and those who cannot will increasingly find themselves in very slow
lanes. For instance, Time Warner ran a pilot project in a medium sized
community in the United States to research whether customers would be willing
to pay rather high fees for fast services; they found that customers would-that
is, those who could pay.
Perhaps one of the most significant new developments is the use of the
World Wide Web and firewalls by firms to set up their own internal computer
networks. Rather than using costly computer systems that need expert staffing
and employee training, firms can use the World Wide Web to do what those
systems do at almost no cost and with little need for expert staffing. Firms save
enormous amounts of money by using the World Wide Web for their own
internal corporate purposes. Around 1995, businesses discovered that the
World Wide Web is a great medium to communicate with customers, partners,
and investors. Now they are using the World Wide Web to set up internal
networks surrounded by firewalls. Beyond very elementary uses such as
providing information about new developments and establishing directories that
can be updated easily, these intranets create access to a firm's various databases
and make them easy to use for everyone in the firm, no matter what computer
systems, software, or time zone they are in. Firms can avoid complicated,
costly, and time consuming retrieval procedures which have often meant that
these databases were of little use in decisionmaking.
Private intranets use the infrastructure and standards of the Internet and
World Wide Web, a cheap and astoundingly efficient method compared to other
forms of internal communication systems. For instance, Lotus Notes, the
leading provider of internal computer network technology, has far more
complexity than is often necessary; furthermore, it is expensive and requires
expert staffing. Because World Wide Web browsers run on any type of
computer, the same electronic information can be viewed by any employee.
Intranets using the World Wide Web can pull all the computers, software, and
databases of a corporation into a single system that enables employees to find
information wherever it is in the system.
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Is this a private appropriation of a public good? It seems to me there are
definite elements ofthis here, especially in view of the millions of dollars firms
can save. Are the firewalled intranets and tunnels the citadels of electronic
space? The formation of private intranets on the World Wide Web is probably
one of the sharper instances of cyber-segmentation.
In part, these cyber-segmentations result from the fact that digital space is
embedded. We cannot read it as a purely technological event and in terms
merely of its technical capacities. It is inscribed by the structures and dynamics
within which it is embedded: the Internet is a different type of space from the
private networks of the financial industry; and the firewalled corporate sites on
the World Wide Web are different from the public portion of the World Wide
Web. Beyond the questions of intentionality and use lies the question of
infrastructure: electronic space is going to be far more available in highly
industrialized countries than in the less-developed world and far more present
for middle class households in developed countries than for poor households in
those same countries.
Digital space, whether private or public, is partly embedded in actual
societal structures and power dynamics: its topography weaves in and out of
non-electronic space. In the case of private electronic space, this feature carries
enormous implications for the theorization ofdigital space, for the results of the
digitalization of economic activity, and for the conditions through which
governments and citizens can act on this new electronic world of the economy
and power. The embeddedness of private economic electronic space entails the
formation of massive concentrations of infrastructure, not only worldwide
dispersal, and a complex interaction between conventional communications
infrastructure and digitalization.23
There is no purely digital economy and no completely virtual corporation.
This means that power, contestation, and inequality, in brief hierarchy, inscribe
electronic space. And, although the digitalized portions of these industries,
particularly finance, have the capacity to subvert the established hierarchies,
new hierarchies are being formed, born out of the existing material conditions
underlying power and the new conditions created by electronic space.
It is for these reasons that it becomes so important to take seriously the
threats to the distributed power-the absence of hierarchy-of the Internet. Yes,
23. These are dynamics that lie at the heart of my model about the digitalization of leading economic
sectors in global cities. See generally SASKIA SASSEN, THE GLOBAL CiTy (1991).
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it is a space of freedom; but it is also increasingly a contested space, and that
means it is a space of resistance.
IV. BEYOND THE INTERNET'S IMPACT: SOVEREIGNTY RECONFIGURED?
The growth of the Internet as a significant space for practices of various
kinds is taking place at a time when we see a number of major transformations
in national sovereignty. I find it quite impossible to consider the matters raised
by Perritt as if sovereignty itself were a stable condition.
There are two issues here. One is the historicity of the character of
sovereignty located in the state-that particular kind of intermediary. Over the
last few years, we have seen a shift of some components of this sovereignty to
other entities-supranational and sub-national as well as non- governmental
entities. Who gains legitimacy as a claimant under these new conditions?
There are different capacities in different sectors. The Internet could become
an extremely important public space for strengthening the claims of non-state
actors who lack the resources of globally oriented corporations or of other
sectors with considerable resources. The second issue is the need to examine
the assumption about the state as the exclusive representative of its people. It
is no longer simply a matter of Liberal vs. Realist interpretation. I find this
framework confining in Perritt's analysis, even though I agree with his main
point that states differ, and that depending on their characterization, they will
be more or less affected by the Internet. The notion of the state as the exclusive
representative needs to be subjected to critical investigation. Different
intermediaries may emerge, including private bodies, in arenas where public
bodies used to govern. 4 Seeing the rise of markets and of transnational
corporate actors, I cannot help but ask whether Liberal theory and its enactment
in political or state practice necessarily imply a Liberal state: we have
historically perhaps seen this, but today the elements are there to reconfigure
this association.
Further, if we are going to consider issues of sovereignty and democracy,
as Perritt seeks to do in his article, then we must ask a critical question about
which actors are gaining influence under conditions of digitization and whose
claims are gaining legitimacy. For instance, it could be argued that private
digital space has had a far sharper impact on questions of sovereignty than the
Internet. The globalization and digitization of financial markets have made
24. See generally SASSEN, LOsING CONTROL., supra note 5.
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these markets a powerful presence. Indeed, the logic of the global capital
markets is today not merely a condition of raw power but one with normative
potential. The logic of these markets has contributed to the elaboration of a set
of criteria for what is proper government conduct on the economy. This new
power of the financial markets is partly a consequence of the orders of
magnitude they have reached in good part through their digitalization and the
fact that they are globally integrated, two conditions that are mutually
reinforcing. The capacity of these markets to affect existing meanings of
sovereignty is considerable and, in my view, thus far has been greater than that
of the Internet.25
New transnational regimes and institutions are creating systems that
strengthen the claims of certain actors (corporations and large multinational
legal firms) and correspondingly weaken the position of smaller players and
states.26 Ruggie has pointed out that the issue is not whether such new
institutions and major economic actors will substitute national states but rather
the possibility of major changes in the system of states: "global markets and
transnationalized corporate structures ... are not in the business of replacing
states", yet they can have the potential for producing fundamental change in the
system of states."
What matters here is that global capital has made claims on national states,
and these states have responded through the production of new forms of
legality.28 The new geography of global economic processes, and the strategic
territories for economic globalization had to be produced, both in terms of the
practices of corporate actors and the requisite infrastructure, and in terms of the
work ofthe state in producing or legitimating new legal regimes.29 One possible
reading of recent developments in the earlier Mexico crisis and in the current
25. Id. at 60-83. See also SASSEN, THE GLOBAL CrrY, supra note 23.
26. See SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL?, supra note 5, at 1-34.
27. John Gerard Ruggie, Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International
Relations, 47 INT'L ORG. 139, 143 (1993).
28. In many ways the state is involved in this emerging transnational governance system. This state,
however, has itselfundergone transformation and has participated in legitimating a new doctrine about the role
of the state in the economy. Central to this new doctrine is a growing consensus among states to further the
growth and strength of the global economy. See generally GLOBALIZATION: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS (James H.
Mittelman ed., 1996).
29. Representations that characterize the national state as simply losing significance fail to capture this
very important dimension, and reduce what is happening to a function of a putative global-national
duality-what one wins, the other loses. I view deregulation not simply as a loss of control by the state but as
a crucial mechanism to negotiate the juxtaposition of the inter-state consensus to pursue globalization and the
fact that national legal systems remain as the major, or crucial instantiation through which guarantees of
contract and property rights are enforced.
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Asian crisis, but also in a more structural context-the adoption of neoliberal
economic principles by governments wanting to join the global economic
markets-is that these markets have emerged as non-state "actors" whose
claims have acquired a new legitimacy."
This then invites us to raise a whole set of questions about how certain
actors have gained this legitimacy in their claims, and in the case ofthe specific
concerns in Perritt's article, how the development of digitalization has favored
some actors over others. Against this reading, the impact of the digitization of
finance on national state sovereignty has thus far been far more significant than
anything we have seen coming from the Internet.
Put this way, it still leaves unaddressed the question about the future impact
of the Internet. And here I would say that commercialization may well dampen
the impact of the Internet in terms of political practices. I return to my earlier
point about the importance of strengthening the variety of cultures active on the
Internet as well as the importance of struggles for greater bandwidth for civil
society actors and for those organizations who cannot pay for increasingly
scarce bandwidth.
In my opinion, the risk with Perritt's analysis of this particular issue is
complacency about the democratic potential of the Internet. The potential is
there, but we cannot take it for granted, nor can we assume that
commercialization is simply going to strengthen this democratic potential. It
may well be the case that in the context of the former centrally planned
economies of Central Europe and the former Soviet Union, commerce on the
Internet is a democratizing practice-at least for a while. The privatization of
portions of the Internet, electronic commerce, and the almost inevitably
associated strengthening of intellectual property rights on the Internet, are all
to be taken seriously. If uses by civil society multiply, grow, strengthen, and
raise the interconnections among various non-state actors in various locations
across the globe, then there is probably less to worry about. However, right
now, there is not enough of this, and the risk is that we are left with a poor
man's Internet, with slow connections, in competition for bandwidth with
entities that can pay for expensive technology or, for that matter, not so
30. There are two distinct issues here. One is the formation of new legal regimes that negotiate between
national sovereignty and the transnational practices of corporate economic actors. The second issue is the
particular content of this new regime, one which contributes to strengthen the advantages of certain types of
economic actors and to weaken those of others.
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expensive but still involving costs that often cannot be afforded by many
community organizations or underfunded sectors of civil society.
V. THE INTERNET AND REGULATION
A different issue of sovereignty is raised in Perritt's discussion about the
possibilities of regulating the Internet. I think Perritt's qualified answer to this
question makes a contribution. I agree with his assessment that if there is to be
some kind of regulation it is going to be very different from what we have
usually understood by regulation. It is certainly the case that in many ways the
Internet escapes or overrides most conventional jurisdictions.
Here I would like to focus briefly on a fact that has been left out of the
discussion: there is a central authority overseeing some of the crucial features
of the Internet." This does not mean that regulation is ipso facto possible. It
merely signals that the representation of the Internet as escaping all authority
is simply inadequate." The nature of this authority is not necessarily akin to
regulatory authorities, but it is a gate-keeping system of sorts and raises the
possibility of oversight capacities. Even though these oversight capacities
would entail considerable innovation in our concepts of regulation, they signal
that there are possibilities overlooked in a faulty characterization of the
architecture of the Internet.
The only centrally managed function of the Internet is the allocation and
maintenance of the global system of addresses. It involves the control and
assignment of the numbers that computers need to locate an address. It
therefore can instruct all the top "root servers" of the Internet-the computers
that execute address inquiries-and the servers will accept these instructions.
This is, clearly, a power of sorts. However, it has not been formalized, in good
part because its origins lie in the first phase of the Internet. It is the power held
by the group of computer scientists who invented the communication protocols
and agreed on the standards that make the Internet work today. They worked
at debugging the systems over the last twenty years and did so not necessarily
31. There are also more specific issues that may affect the regulation of particular forms of digital activity
through a focus on infrastructure. There are different types of infrastructure for different types of digital
activities, for instance, financial markets versus consumer wireless phones. This is a subject I have elaborated
elsewhere. See Saskia Sassen, The State and the Global City, in GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DiscorrENTs, supra
note 4.
32. See John Perry Barlow, Declaration of Independence of Cyberspace (Feb. 9, 1996)
<http://www.eff.org/pub/Publications/John-Perry_ Barlow/barlow_0296.declaration>.
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under contract by any agency in particular. It is a de facto group which has
worked at making the Internet workable since its beginnings. 3 The particular
function of assigning addresses is crucial and today is under the control of one
particular scientistwho has named this function the "Internet Assigned Numbers
Authority."'
As the Internet has grown and become more international, there appears to
be growing concern that a more organized and accountable system is necessary.
This signals the presence of sectors with the will to strengthen and develop this
central authority. Further, there is at this point in time (February 1998) still a
single firm that registers new addresses, working on behalf of the National
Science Foundation." The "International Ad Hoc Committee", formed by some
of these scientists as a response to the introduction in 1995 of fees for Internet
address registrations, can be seen as another instance of a central structure in
the Internet. The Committee proposed a Geneva-based body for the governing
of the Internet, with the active participation of the International
Telecommunications Union and broad international representation.
While the intention behind the proposal is to extricate the address
registration power from a firm with monopoly control (and profits), the outcome
would be the formation of yet another central governing body for the Internet.
The Clinton Administration and the European Union have also put forth
proposals for managing the Internet address system.16 Secondly, while the
purpose of such a governing body would not be about regulation per se, its
existence and, perhaps more importantly, the necessity of some such body,
represents a significant operational opening for some sort of regulation or
governance. This is often overlooked in many discussions about the Internet
and its freedoms.
33. One could consider the community of scientists who have worked on making the Internet workable
and who have had to reach many agreements on a broad range of technical matters, as a sort of informal central
"authority." In most other cultural settings they would probably have become a formal, recognizable body with
considerable power. There is an interesting sociology here.
34. With the growth of business interest in the Internet, the de facto authority of the early pioneers of the
Internet and their logic for assigning addresses has begun to be criticized. For instance, firms found that their
names had already been assigned to other parties and that there was little they could do; the whole idea ofbrand
names and intellectual property rights over a name was not part of the early Internet culture.
35. This firm, Network Solutions, now has a monopoly over the sale of registration permits, though it is
basically using the public good represented by the protocols and systems developed by a group of scientists who
did it basically for free in the context of a culture foreign to the idea of charging.
36. The Clinton plan would add five new address types and establish a private sector not-for profit
organization to oversee the Internet address system. It also seeks to provide a legal framework for handling
disputes. The European Union has proposed an international charter for governing the Internet.
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CONCLUSION
The Internet is only one portion of the vast new world of digital space, and
many of the dramatic features attributed to the Internet's power to neutralize
sovereignty are actually features of private digital networks, such as those used
in international finance. Similarly, the key to many of the current
transformations and their potential to limit sovereignty may not be the
elimination of sovereignty but its unbundling and partial relocation to supra-,
sub-, and non-national institutions.
In this regard, Perritt's article on the Internet and sovereignty makes some
important contributions to a more qualified analysis in its refusal to consider it
an either/or question and to point out that in many circumstances the Internet
may strengthen state sovereignty and, most importantly perhaps, the institutions
of international law. However it also misreads some of the features of the
Internet, confuses private digital space with public digital space (the Internet),
and reads some of the positive impacts through theoretical categories that
exclude a critical examination of who are emerging as legitimate claimants
today under the ascendance of Liberalism in the global economy and in inter-
state relations and whose claims remain unrecognized.
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